2019 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-16-2019

Bruce Kibe, Jr. v. Commissioner Social Security

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019

Recommended Citation
"Bruce Kibe, Jr. v. Commissioner Social Security" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 1002.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/1002

This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 19-2079
__________
BRUCE A. KIBE, JR.,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court Civil No. 2-18-cv-00228)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 1, 2019
BEFORE: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 16, 2019)
__________
OPINION*
__________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Bruce Kibe, Jr., appeals from the decision of the District Court granting
summary judgment to the Commissioner of Social Security who denied Kibe’s claim for
disability benefits. We review to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.1 We will affirm.
As the parties are familiar with the record, we raise here only those facts that are
essential to our decision. Kibe contends, first, that the ALJ erred at step three of the fivestep analysis by concluding that his impairments (learning disorder/borderline intellectual
functioning, bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder) did not show the marked
restrictions necessary to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing gainful
activity”2 consistent with the impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
12.05 (intellectual disorder). Kibe points to his verbal comprehension IQ score of 70 and
contends the ALJ erroneously relied on speculative inferences from the record to
discredit it. Kibe also complains that the ALJ ignored the fact that, while in school, he
was placed in specialized classes for learning disabled students. This placement, of itself,
he says, was significant evidence of his impairment.
Yet, the ALJ pointed to an array of evidence that undermined the IQ score as an
accurate reflection of the severity of Kibe’s impairment. Kibe did not produce any
physician diagnoses of an intellectual disability. Dr. David Newman diagnosed only

1

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). “We have jurisdiction under
both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review final determinations by the
Commissioner.” Id.
2
20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a).
2

borderline intellectual functioning. In addition, Kibe showed adaptive ability by: tending
to his own personal care; independently making and keeping his own medical
appointments; showing an ability to read and write; and, exhibiting an ability to do
gainful employment. Moreover, after acknowledging that Kibe was in special education
classes and had academic scores in a low to moderate range, the ALJ evaluated this
evidence as insufficient to show low intellectual function. In short, the ALJ did not
ignore or misinterpret crucial evidence relevant to step three of the analysis, nor did the
decision rely on mere speculation. The ALJ’s decision that Kibe’s impairments did not
show the marked restrictions necessary to meet a listed impairment is supported by
substantial evidence. There is no basis here to remand.
Kibe next contends that the ALJ did not include his borderline intellectual
functioning, as well as marked limitations in a number of areas, in the questions to the
vocational expert at step five of the analysis. He maintains that this undermines the
Residual Functional Capacity finding. The ALJ erred, he argues, by disregarding
evidence of limitations in social interactions, as exhibited in Kibe’s verbal and physical
altercations with co-workers, and similar behavior with people outside of work. He
contends this demonstrates a marked limitation on his ability to work with others.
Next Kibe says the ALJ brushed aside the opinion of his treating physician who
opined that Kibe was completely disabled. He maintains that Dr. Joel Last’s observations
and conclusions carried great weight because he was his treating physician. He also
asserts that the ALJ relied instead on “stale” evidence.
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There are a number of problems with his contentions. The ALJ has wide latitude
to create hypothetical questions that incorporate a claimaint’s functional limitations. The
ALJ also has ample discretion to weigh Kibe’s own opinions about his difficulties in
work environments. With that said, noting that Kibe had mental limitations and moderate
difficulties in social functioning, the record shows that the ALJ constructed hypotheticals
accounting for superficial or minimal contact with the general public and co-workers.
The hypotheticals also addressed a need for simple, repetitive tasks and precluded work
with a fast pace or with production quotas. As for Dr. Last’s opinion, the ALJ did not
disregard it. He accepted Last’s diagnosis of a schizoaffective disorder. But, as for his
opinion on functional limitations and his general assessment that Kibe was completely
disabled, the ALJ noted that the Doctor’s own record did not support his conclusions.
The ALJ characterized Kibe’s medical treatment as conservative and largely successful in
managing his impairments (for instance, dropping from monthly appointments to threemonth appointments to monitor his medication), contradicting Dr. Last’s conclusions
about Kibe’s marked limitations. This led the ALJ to give less weight to Last’s opinion,
eliminating any concerns about the date of the evidence the ALJ relied upon. The ALJ’s
hypotheticals reflected the entire record; his analysis properly focused on assessing
evidence of Kibe’s functional limitations. We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits.
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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